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ABSTRACT: The rhetorical theory of argument, if held as the conclusion of an argument, is self-defeating. 
There are two arguments that it is. First is the quick and dirty argument: the rhetorical theory is that 
argument quality is adjudged by eliciting conviction, but the case for the theory is not convincing. Second 
is the process argument: if one has the view that one’s reasons are arranged with the sole purpose of 
eliciting assent, one does not view one’s resultant commitments as reflective of truth. 
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1. THE RHETORICAL THEORY OF ARGUMENT 
 
The rhetorical theory of argument is the view that the norms of argumentation derive 
from the practice of eliciting assent from audiences. On the rhetorical theory, arguments 
are speech acts performed for the sake of addressing some conflict or alleviating a 
concern, and their quality should be measured according to how effectively they achieve 
these ends. The theory has been expressed as follows:1 
 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca: The goal of all argumentation […] is to create or increase 
adherence of minds to the theses presented for their assent (1969, p. 45). 
 
Wenzel: [F]rom the standpoint of rhetoric, a good argument is an effective one (1980, p. 120) 
 
Crosswhite: [T]he aim of argumentation is to gain the adherence of other people […] The merit of 
an argument can be determined by knowing the quality of the audience which would assent to it. 
Thus, a rhetoric of reason calls for a reception theory of rationality. (1996, p. 36) 
 
Tindale: [A]rguments are judged successful and evaluated not directly in terms of their internal 
logical support, but in terms of their impact on the audience. The aim of argumentation is the 
adherence to its theses. It will be judged strong or weak according to the degrees to which this is 
accomplished. (1999, pp. 85-6) 
 
1 “The aim of argumentation is not to deduce consequences from given premises; it is rather to elicit or 
increase adherence of the members of an audience to theses presented for their consent.” (Perelman 1982, 
9) For further statements of the rhetorical theory, see: Johnstone 1952, p. 489; Burke 1984, p. 22; Sillence 
and Minors 1991; p. 290, Gross 2000, p. 319; and Schollmeier 2002, p. 386. 
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The general case for the rhetorical theory runs that, on the one hand, traditional theories 
fail to produce satisfying interpretive schemata and evaluative standards for arguments. 
Viewing arguments solely as logical products skews their evaluation. On the other hand, 
rhetorical theories, in their take on processes of argumentation, provide modes for 
interpretation of arguments as instruments and criteria for evaluation in terms of their 
effectiveness. Another appeal of the rhetorical theory is that there are no standards 
invisible to arguers—no need to point to formal logical truths or procedural rules with 
which arguers at best may be tacitly familiar.2 There are only arguers, the things they say 
and how they say them, audiences, and their assent or denial. Other motives for the 
theory are its purported ethical import of respect for interlocutors3 and the fact that it 
makes argument something worthy and attractive4.  Importantly, my self-defeat argument 
is limited only to what might be called the strong program in the rhetorical theory of 
argument, namely, that all forms of argument are primarily rhetorical. Christopher 
Tindale captures the strong program by claiming that all argumentative standards, even 
logical standards, are audience-dependent, “the rhetorical is the vehicle for the 
development of the logical, for the logical is a product of audience and can be nothing 
more, nor less” (2004, p. 143). Perelman similarly holds, “all argumentation is rhetorical” 
(1965, p. 168). Contrast the strong program with modest programs that acknowledge 
separate spheres of evaluation, rhetoric being one among many other independent schema 
for evaluation (dialectical, epistemological, logical, and so on). I will mean only the 
strong program by ‘rhetorical theory of argument.’ 
The central commitment of the rhetorical theory is the instrumental view on 
arguments and the processes of argumentation—that they are means to ends, and 
instruments and techniques are to be adjudged according to that criterion.5 This thesis is a 
two-part commitment, one descriptive account of what arguments are and a normative 
view as to how arguments are to be evaluated: 
 
R1: Arguments are speech acts performed for the sake of eliciting assent or 
increasing commitment in an addressed audience. 
R2: Arguments are to be assessed according to their effectiveness in 
eliciting the assent or increasing the commitment sought in their 
addressed audience.  
 
The first thing to note is that R1 does not entail R2: the purposes of actions do not always 
mean they evaluated only in terms of whether they are successful.6 The case for their 
                                                 
2 Versions of this argument are made by Hamblin 1970, p. 241; Crosswhite 1996, p. 161; and Heysse 1997, 
p. 220. 
3 Crosswhite 1996, p. 154; Tindale 1999, pp. 188-90. 
4 Crosswhite 1996, p. 135. 
5 Scholmeier notes this connection between the rhetorical theory and pragmatism as forms of 
instrumentalism not only of the products of argument but the processes 2002, p. 389. 
6 For example, lies are speech acts performed for the sake of eliciting beliefs and actions that the speaker 
takes as false or misdirected. But surely we have criteria for evaluating lies beyond whether they achieve 
their ends—a lie’s effectiveness has no direct bearing on whether it is good or just. What agents and 
cognizers are trying to accomplish with their actions surely is relevant to our normative assessments, but 
their effectiveness would only be part of such assessments. More on this issue in the coming pages. 
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tighter connection in the case of the rhetorical theory, however, is along interpretive lines. 
The argument runs that arguments cannot be evaluated without interpretations of what the 
case made is, and this requires we consider the speaker’s goals in addressing her audience 
and how the audience experiences the speaker’s case. This requires a knowledge of the 
argument’s context, what divides the speaker from the audience (the issue), and how the 
audience responds to the argument. Tindale notes that a desideratum of a theory of 
argument is that it provide “the most complete and satisfying account of what 
argumentation is, of what it is like to be engaged in argumentation, to be argued to, and to 
evaluate arguments” (1999, p. 7). The phenomenological perspective on argument yields 
the norms for evaluation that allow us to see the norms at work in the acts of arguers and 
their audiences. 
Though the rhetorical theory of argument is about arguments and argumentation 
as performative instrumental processes, the theory itself is a theory, a proposition about 
arguments. Given that other theories of argument are rejected for some reasons and there 
are reasons that support the rhetorical theory, let us see the final case for the rhetorical 
theory of argument as a product of argumentation—as an argument for the truth of R1 
and R2. Once we have taken this product-turn on the rhetorical theory, the troubles begin. 
 
2. THE QUICK AND DIRTY ARGUMENT 
 
The two commitments of the rhetorical theory, R1 and R2, are held on the basis of 
arguments. R1 and R2 are tied together—once we take the perspective of those engaged 
in the process of argument, the goals of argumentative speech acts and the norms of their 
evaluation are tied. Further, the theory is that R1 and R2 are true of arguments. 
Consequently, we must ask: if R1 and R2 are true of arguments, how well do the 
arguments for them live up to the standards set for them? 
If R1 and R2 are true of argument, I would not have any reason to accept the 
arguments in favour of them. The following is an account as to how that is so. There are 
two ways we can see this. First is the quick and dirty way, and second is the process way.  
The quick and dirty way is as follows. I’ve been exposed to the arguments for the 
rhetorical theory, and they did not convince me. So, by R2, they must not be very good 
arguments. I don’t call it the quick and dirty argument for nothing.  
Further, imagine a rhetorical theorist objecting to the quickness and dirtiness of 
the argument along these lines:  
 
That doesn’t count against the theory, because you’ve overlooked some 
important point or datum. 
 
But note now the defence of the theory is very different from the theory: isn’t it the 
rhetor’s job to address the audience? Moreover, this defence requires that there are 
justifying elements to arguments that must obtain independently of audience assessment 
or acceptance, ones that, presumably, audiences are obliged to attend to if they are to be 
reasonable interlocutors. But this isn’t the rhetorical theory anymore—arguments can be 
good arguments independently of audience-acceptance. But there is a further defence for 
the rhetorical theory here. R2 runs that we evaluate arguments according to acceptance by 
an audience, not any audience—arguments are addressed to specific audiences at specific 
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times, and it is excessive to demand that they be right for anyone who happens to pick up 
the book. And they weren’t tailoring their arguments for me. So the answer is, basically: 
We weren’t talking to you.7  To his credit, James Crosswhite notes explicitly that his 
work is “addressed primarily to an audience concerned with the teaching of composition, 
secondarily to philosophers, teachers of critical thinking, composition theorists and 
educational administrators and policy makers” (1996, p. 3). He then argues that the 
rhetorical theory itself is not a description of the “necessary a priori features of all 
reasoning,” but rather “an account which is better for particular purposes, and more 
convincing in the context in which it is offered, than are competing accounts” (1996, p. 
16). Fair enough, but, I teach writing, am a philosopher, teach critical thinking, and have 
been a consultant for humanities curricula. I am a member of Crosswhite’s primary and 
secondary audience. Perelman, too, takes what he’s doing is philosophy, and hence must 
address a universal audience (1982, p. 17), which is “thought of as including all men who 
are rational and competent with respect to the issues that are being debated” (1968a, p. 
21). Unless my membership card is expired, I think I belong to that class. And so the 
quick and dirty argument gets it done. 
 
3. THE PROCESS ARGUMENT 
 
The quick and dirty argument may be both too quick and too dirty in ways that invalidate 
it. Surely one thing it fails to accomplish is respect the processive element of 
argumentation that the rhetorical theory emphasizes. Something from the perspective of 
someone who is convinced by the theory may be necessary. What is called for is what I 
call a process version of the argument. It starts with the, I think plausible, observation 
that there is a distance between seeing oneself as being convinced of some proposition 
and taking that proposition as true. That is, we may often express our commitment to a 
view, but also express the distance between our commitment and its truth. Our usual 
attitudes of commitment are transparent, in that if you’re committed to some content p, 
you’re committed to its truth. When we are convinced of our beliefs’ truth, we just assert 
them unvarnished: we just say “p.” It’s raining. My foot hurts. You’re late. But there are 
cases where expressions of commitment can be peeled apart from commitments to truths. 
For example, when we do not know that something is true, but nevertheless find ourselves 
committed, we say: 
 
(1) I believe that p. 
 
We express our assent to p, but it seems, also withhold our commitment to its truth.8 In 
the same way, we can capture this distance between commitment and truth in the third 
person: 
 
                                                 
7 If this defense sounds implausible and uncharitable, it is. But it has been given, but (lucky for the 
ones giving the defense) under anonymity of review: “[A] rhetorical theorist, having accepted the 
pragmatist assumptions of his/her approach, rejects [the argument] and so is not concerned by this 
alleged refutation.” And, “[R]hetorical theory is just assumed to fit neatly into a philosophical 
framework from which it has recently self-consciously separated itself.” 
8 See my 2006 for an extended analysis of contrastively attributing beliefs to oneself. 
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(2) He believes that p. 
 
The point here is that we can recognize some arguments as ones that elicit our assent, but 
eliciting our assent is one thing and convincing us that what we assent to is true is 
something else. It is a qualified or very weak endorsement of an argument to say that one 
was convinced by it. But it is something else to assess the argument as giving one a 
reason to believe the truth of its conclusion. The fact that one believes its conclusion, it 
seems is, again, only a qualified commitment to its truth, as we saw with 1, above. For 
example (and this may be a bit too autobiographical, but here goes) I found myself 
convinced by almost everything Bill Clinton said, but I would hardly say that what I was 
convinced of was true. This has not yet said anything about the argument or its quality. 
One can say of arguments that they convinced some third party, but are bad arguments: 
 
(3) He was convinced by argument (A) to accept p, but A is a bad argument for p. 
 
Additionally, one can even say this of oneself, so that one can concede that the argument 
was successful in eliciting assent, but was a bad argument. We express argumentative 
regret: 
 
(4) I was convinced by A to accept p, but A is a bad argument for p. 
 
On top of this, it seems that the speaker in either case can be qualifiedly convinced (as in 
1, above) of the conclusion and yet utter either of these statements. These are cases where 
speakers can recognize their own intellectual shortcomings, that, perhaps, they are 
suckers for certain tropes or the manners of some speaker. (Again, imagine someone like 
myself, who’s a fool for Clinton-isms.) They express their commitments, but do not fully 
commit to a truth. With these cases, one takes a third-personal view on one’s own beliefs 
and takes there to be a distance between one’s qualified assent and the truth of what is 
assented to. 
This said, if we have what might be called unqualified assent from the first person 
perspective (ones where one’s commitments are transparent and we assert unvarnished 
“p”), we have the commitment to the truth and the commitment to a proposition tied 
closely. Statements like (1) and (4) are out of bounds. Further, one cannot, without 
thereby qualifying or weakening the commitment, utter statements like: 
 
(5) I hold that p is true, but for reasons that have nothing directly to do with p’s 
truth. 
(6) I hold that p is true on the basis of an argument devised only to elicit my 
assent to p. 
 
For there to be a tight connection between assessing oneself to be committed to a 
proposition and holding that proposition true, one must take oneself to hold the 
commitment on the basis of reasons indicative of that proposition’s truth, not reasons 
designed to elicit assent. That is, unqualified assent is reality-centered—it’s about the 
facts, and one holds one’s commitment to be fact-based. Qualified assent is subject-
centered—it is not about the facts, but about the speaker, and one holds one’s 
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commitment to be based on her own inclinations, beliefs, and unique standards. 
Statements 5 and 6 qualify the commitment, and this can be seen in the similarity of the 
following:  
 
(7) He holds that p is true, but for reasons that have nothing directly to do with p’s 
truth. 
(8) He holds that p on the basis of an argument devised only to elicit his assent to 
p. 
 
In 8, we see that the third person’s assent to the premises of the argument has nothing 
directly to do with p’s truth. But it is about that third person (what to expect from him or 
her, some history that brought about the belief, and so on). The thought generalizes just 
as statement 2 does to yield the equivalent qualification in 1, so that 6 is a qualified 
commitment to p, not an unqualified commitment.  
 Now let us apply these lessons to the rhetorical theory of argument. R1 and R2 are 
supported by arguments (A1, A2, …, An), and so those that hold they are true 
presumably hold them on the basis of those arguments. They must hold the following: 
 
(9) I hold R1 and R2 on the basis of A1, A2, …, An. 
 
Perelman claims that “all argumentation is rhetorical” and the emphasized quantifier 
certainly extends this analysis to his own case for the rhetorical theory (1968b, p. 168). 
Since the rhetorical theory bears on the arguments that support it, the following is a 
consequence: 
 
(10) R1 and R2 are true of A1, A2, …, An. 
(11) A1, A2, …, An are devised only to elicit my assent with regard to R1 and R2 
and are to be evaluated according to how well they elicit my assent. 
 
Once we have closed the implications of R1 and R2 with regard to A1, A2, …, An, we 
should yield the following: 
 
(12) I hold R1 and R2 on the basis of arguments devised to elicit and to be 
evaluated only on the basis of my assent. 
 
The problem is that 12, like 1 and 6 before, yields a statement of qualified assent, and not 
unqualified assent—one reports the beliefs and inclinations of a cognizer, not an 
endorsement of the truth of the views. If R2 is true, then the arguments must not be 
particularly good arguments, because the quality of an argument is determined by the 
degree of adherence. Since this is qualified assent, the argument must not be effective, 
and hence, on R2, is not a good argument. This reasoning then reduces 12, instead of to 6, 
but to 4, which amounts to outright confession of intellectual failure.9 
                                                 
9  A related problem is that the reception theory of rationality behind R1 and R2 seems to impel evaluators of 
arguments to silence on features of arguments that would make them acceptable or not. They then face the following 
question: 
 
Is argument A a good argument because you assent to it, or do you assent to A because it is good?  
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4. PERFORMATIVE CONTRADICTION REDUX? 
 
A version of this self-defeat argument has been made before, and rhetorical theorists have 
been aware of something along its lines for some time. Robert Rowland presents one such 
line of criticism, namely, that in order to critique traditional concepts of rationality, 
postmodernists must make use of the tools of rationality, specifically, arguments (1995). 
So there is a “ ‘performative contradiction’ at the heart of postmodern critique,” because 
postmodernists’ cases must proceed on the basis of their “use (of) argument to attack 
argument” (p. 351). Because this is a critique, the postmoderns “claim that their positions 
are more defensible than those of their opponents” (p. 351). However, in making these 
arguments, they “recognize […] the functional utility of general standards for testing 
argument form and process” (1995, 358). Jürgen Habermas’s argument from 
‘performative contradiction’ in his Philosophical Discourse on Modernity also takes a 
similar tack, as he notes that when one takes critique as rhetoric, one “dulls the sword of 
the critique of reason itself” (1987, p. 210). 
This ‘performative contradiction’ line of argument is similar to mine here, but it is 
not identical. First, Rowland and Habermas’s argument is taken as a defence of rational 
argument from the critique of postmoderns—namely, that because theorists X and Y (the 
usual suspects) use arguments in their critique of argument, they must tacitly rely on 
rational argument. This is not my argument. Instead, my argument is that if one is 
convinced by the case for rhetorical theory (it may not even be arguments, traditionally 
conceived), one will be progressively less and less convinced by the case when one views 
it again through the lenses of the theory. That the rhetorical theory is self-defeating is not 
yet the stronger vindication of rational argument we see in Rowland and Habermas. The 
failure of the strong program on my argument is logically distinct from (though certainly 
relevant to) the defence of rational argument. 
 A second difference between my argument here and the Habermas-Rowland 
performative contradiction argument is that theirs proceeds from the perspective of the 
conditions for argument. Though I am sympathetic with that method, I am not employing 
it here. My method, instead of what must precede arguments, is from what follows from 
the arguments for the strong program of rhetoric. The only assumptions here are that the 
pragmatic force of saying that one believes a proposition weakens one’s expressed 
commitment to its truth and that when one sees a case as addressed expressly to you 
instead of about the facts, there is a correlate weakening of commitment, even if the case 
yields assent. These are not the transcendental inferences at work in the Rowland-
Habermas arguments, but rather observations about how self-ascribed commitment 
works. Nevertheless, a defence of my argument here against some challenges to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
If the good-making property of an argument is the former, then it seems that evaluators should explain the badness of 
an argument in terms of their rejection of it, which is  precisely how 12 reduces to 4. But this gets the phenomenology 
of responsible argument evaluation backwards. Surely if someone has directed an argument to us in order to change our 
minds, we would evaluate the argument as good only on the conditions that it gives us a better position on the issue, 
one that allows us a better command of the fact, one that fits with the evidence. Conceding that an argument made you 
unqualifiedly change your mind means that you’ve overcome your inclination to reject the conclusion by way of your 
attentiveness to something in the argument beyond your inclination to assent. You get over yourself and you attend to 
the facts. 
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Habermas-Rowland line of argument is worthwhile, if only because it seems widely taken 
that rhetoric’s strong program can answer the performative contradiction argument.  
 I do not have space to address the postmodern responses to Habermas, but 
Christopher Tindale has responded to Rowland’s argument in a manner that can focus 
discussion. His rebuttal runs as follows (I have numbered the distinct arguments for 
reference): 
 
[W]hile this raises interesting questions, such as (i) how the history of Reason can contain the 
conditions that give rise to its own critique, (ii) it fails to engage the debate in a useful manner, it 
fails to meet the critics where they stand. Besides, (iii) there may be no inconsistency in using 
argument to show that it does not have the value attributed to it (Tindale 1999, p. 188). 
 
Given the general similarity between Rowland’s argument and mine, I will take these 
rebuttals as relevant to my project, too (and leave Rowland’s responses to Rowland). 
Tindale’s (i) is that the ‘history of Reason’ (note the capital R) can give rise to its own 
critique. But the pronoun reference is unclear—is the critique of Reason or of its history? 
It’s likely the former, and so the thought would be that the activities of Reason over time 
provide evidence for criticisms of Reason. This seems plausible, but only if one takes the 
norms of Reason to be coordinate with that of the functioning of human minds. But that 
coordination strips the norms of Reason (with a big R, which implicates something like 
timeless Platonic forms) of their status as normative in the sense that gives them 
purchase. Surely a defender of Reason so construed would say such an identification begs 
the question (they are timeless forms, you know)—that people make use of and fall for 
fallacies regularly is not evidence against norms of reasoning, and certainly does not bear 
in any way on the norms of Reason. Tindale’s (iii) speaks directly to this, in that given 
our limitations, perhaps the critique of Reason may not be in terms of it achieving 
standards it sets for itself. Instead, it may be in the conflict between standards that are too 
high and the beings upon which they bear—norms that are too demanding may be 
irrelevant. But notice that if the case made is that we cannot meet these standards and so 
we should forego them itself is considerably weaker than these standards (as the 
rhetorical theory must hold that it is), then where does that leave us? Again, rhetorically 
successful arguments are addressed to audiences with certain kinds of commitments, and 
in this case, it must be the commitment to Reason that must function as the criterion. 
(You don’t have to give arguments to give up Reason to those who’ve already done it.) If 
that’s the case, then the arguments that do not live up to the audience’s standards will not 
move them, and this is not the audience’s fault on the rhetorical theory, but the fault of 
the rhetor and her case. As a consequence, the case for the rhetorical theory against 
Reason, to live up to its own standards of being rhetorically successful, is hopeless. 
Tindale’s rebuttal in (ii) runs that the Rowland argument fails to engage the 
debate, because it fails meet the critics of Reason where they stand. This is right in one 
way—the Habermas-Rowland argument proceeds in both cases from theories of 
argument, a transcendental pragmatics in Habermas’s case and a cognitive pragmatism in 
Rowland’s. And so, both import some theoretical apparatus to then criticize their 
opponents. That is a legitimate problem, but Tindale says there is no useful consequence 
of this. This overstates the case, because at issue are the norms of argumentation. Nothing 
useful may come of it if the rhetorical theory is the standard for what’s worthwhile 
coming from an argument—roughly that an argument achieves something useful only if it 
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meets its audience where it lives. But this presumes that the rhetorical theory is right. 
Why else would Tindale require that critics of the rhetorical theory live up to the 
rhetorical theory’s standards? But does the requirement that the critics of rhetoric meet 
those they criticize where they live itself meet those critics of rhetoric where they live? If 
the requirement is that if you’re going to criticize a theory of argument or any of their 
cases, you have to meet them where they live, then does that requirement work when 
applied to criticize those who reject the requirement? I think not, because I reject the 
rhetorical theory of argument. Again, the points that Tindale scores against Rowland and 
Habermas are on the basis of the fact that they import their theories of argument to 
criticize the rhetorical theory—but this case goes through only if one imports the 
rhetorical theory for its own defence. Regardless, the objection doesn’t have to bear on 
my version of the self defeat argument, because I concede at the front end of the process 
version that R1 and R2 are true, and then from the (I suppose) uncontroversial 
observations that belief-embedding qualifies commitment, the result follows. My version 
runs internal to the perspective of someone convinced of the rhetorical theory. So even if 
Tindale’s (ii) is right about Rowland (though I’m not convinced it is), the process self-
defeat argument is still unscathed. 
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